We investigate whether reducing investor information processing costs changes not just how much firms innovate, but how they innovate. Exploiting a 2008 SEC reform that required small firms to adopt standardized disclosure formats without altering information content, we identify effects of disclosure format standardization cleanly separated from the confounding role of proprietary disclosure in prior studies. Consistent with the reform's motivation, treated firms attract investor attention and issue more equity. Beyond these financing effects, treated firms expand R&D, hire new inventors, and increase patent output and value. Moreover, firms pivot their innovation toward more novel, diverse, and exploratory projects. Because these strategic shifts are strongest for firms with classified boards, they reveal a complementarity between financial access and corporate governance: capital alone is not enough to pursue long-term projects unless managers are sheltered from short-term pressure. Consistent with a financial constraints channel, the shift toward exploration concentrates among firms with tighter pre-reform financing constraints and in years following equity issuance, linking this reorientation to relaxing financing frictions that impede long-horizon investment. Collectively, the evidence indicates that disclosure format standardization, requiring no additional disclosure, is sufficient to redirect corporate innovation toward higher-risk, higher-value projects that constrained firms would otherwise forgo.